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The Interaction of Constitutional
Privilege and Statutory Immunity
in Bankruptcy Examinations
John C. Weistar*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Fulfillment of the Bankruptcy Act's objective of securing
equitable settlement of insolvent estates creates an obvious need
for many types of information. Were the bankrupt made to

reveal all transactions into which he entered in the years preceding the adjudication of his insolvency, a court might achieve
maximum protection against secret preferences and concealed
assets. Balanced against this need for information, however,
must be the fundamental constitutional guarantee that no natural person shall be compelled to make disclosures which may
subject him to criminal sanction.' Thus, the debtor who has
evaded taxes, used the mails fraudulently, or obtained goods on
false credit could ordinarily not be made to testify concerning
2
any aspect of these activities.
Section 7(a) (10)3 of the Bankruptcy Act provides the mechanism for acquiring information from the bankrupt. The bankrupt shall at the first meeting of his creditors, at the hearing
upon objection, if any, to his discharge and at such other times
as the court shall order, submit to an examination. Apparently
recognizing the fifth amendment impediment to full disclosure,
Congress, in addition to providing for examination of the bankrupt, included a provision for insulating testimony of the debtor
from use in subsequent criminal proceedings as early as the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.4 The revisions of the statutory scheme
undertaken in the 1938 Chandler Act continued this grant of
*

Member, Illinois Bar

I.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2. The general nature of the proscription found in the mail fraud
statute renders many bankrupts quite vulnerable to prosecution under
it, for an indictment is sustainable merely on the allegation that the
debtor used the mails to secure merchandise upon knowingly inaccurate
representations as to his financial condition. See, e.g., Czarlinsky v.
United States, 54 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931); United States v. Hoyt, 53
F.2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). The temptation to misstate resources is probably significant for the individual attempting to restore financial stability to his business.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (10) (1964).
4. 30 Stat. 548 (1898).
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immunity in substantially unaltered form in section 7(a) (10):-5
"no testimony given by [the bankrupt] shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding, except such testimony as may be given by him in the hearing upon objections
to his discharge."
Even before this immunity provision was introduced into
bankruptcy proceedings, the Supreme Court announced in Counselman v. Hitchcock" that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination could be abridged by legislative action only if
the substituted immunity "is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect" as the right which it supplants. 7 The
practical effect of this pronouncement for bankruptcy proceedings
is to preserve to the debtor the right to refuse to testify to
any incriminating matter not insulated from possible use in future criminal trials s by section 7(a) (10). Every limitation placed
on the scope of the immunity grant by subsequent judicial interpretations represents an impediment to the bankruptcy court's
efforts to gain full disclosure of the debtor's past transactions.0
However, in addition to restricting the scope of the section
7(a) (10) insulation, judicial decisions have added new breath to
the fifth amendment guarantee. This contraction of the immunity grant and simultaneous expansion of the fifth amendment
privilege will be reviewed in the remainder of this Article.
Particular emphasis will be given to those recent decrees which
may suggest that a significant need exists for congressional
re-evaluation of the contemporary effectiveness of the statutory
attempt to insure full disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings.
II. INDIRECT USE OF ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
One characteristic of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination which has long been recognized is its applicability to any matter "which might furnish a clue or a link in a
5. 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (10) (1964).

6. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
7.

Id. at 585.

8. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); United
States v. Lawson, 255 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1966); In re Nachman, 114
F. 995 (D.S.C. 1902).

9. It is imprecise, however, to view the "universe" of incriminating
statements of a bankrupt as totally occupied by the mutually exclusive
concepts of immunity and privilege, for incriminations will be unprotected if they are revealed in the debtor's books and records, see In re
Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911), or if either the privilege or immunity is
waived. Compare In re Bendheim, 180 F. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) with Bain
v. United States, 262 F. 664 (6th Cir. 1920).
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chain of evidence by which a criminal offense might be made
known." ° Thus, the defendant not only could refuse to give
testimony which itself might be introduced against him, but
also could remain silent when his disclosures might be utilized
by investigating officers to uncover other evidence of an alleged
criminal offense. Early construction of the Bankruptcy Act
resulted in findings that its immunity grant did not encompass insulation from this indirect incrimination. Rather, in
reviewing the statutory language, courts found that only subsequent introduction of the bankrupt's oral utterances was proscribed." In view of this limited application of the immunity
grant, the Counselman mandate of the mutual exclusiveness
of immunity and constitutional privilege could be given effect only by reaffirmation of the bankrupt's right to refuse
to make any statement which might be used to unearth other
evidence. This combination of interpretations, while probably
consistent with the intent reflected in the congressional choice
of language, was in many instances fatal to the purpose of insuring that officers of the bankruptcy court were privy to
facts which would facilitate equitable distribution of an estate;
for it would appear that most direct disclosures by the bankrupt
of illicit associations or business activities would yield sources
for additional incriminating discoveries. For example, suppose
a bankrupt who had been engaged in unlawful liquor production
were asked to reveal the identity of a creditor to whom he had
made certain large payments prior to insolvency. Since revealing a source of supply of his operation may lead Treasury Department investigators to other evidence which would support a tax
evasion indictment, the bankrupt could properly refuse to answer
even the threshold question of the supplier's identity. In this
situation, the referee is confronted with the possibility of a
preferential debt payment but is left without adequate procedures through which to insure the sort of recapture and distribution of these assets contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act.
Thus, the incompleteness of the immunity grant precludes even
the receipt of much direct testimony which would ostensibly
appear to be immunized under section 7 (a) (10).
A judicial solution to the referee's dilemma might be borrowed from criminal law precedents. Rather than compelling
10. Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636, 642 (8th Cir. 1906).

See

also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Boyd v. United

States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
11. See Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636 (8th Cir. 1906); In re
Nachman, 114 F. 995, 996 (D.S.C. 1902).
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the bankrupt's invocation of his constitutional privilege, and accepting the concomitant frustration of the Act's purpose, an
exclusionary rule could treat the debtor's testimony in the same
manner as an involuntary utterance of a criminal defendant and
prohibit the introduction of the "fruits" thereof in subsequent
proceedings.' 2 Thus, when the indirectly-revealed evidence was
presented at a criminal trial, the bankrupt could object that it
had previously been immunized. In effect, this proposal represents a call for a judicial broadening of the current statute and
is opened to the obvious objection that such a fundamental al-

teration should be undertaken only through the legislature, the
body responsible for the present statutory weaknesses. Further,
since, to date, no definitive specification has been made of the
extent to which bankruptcy investigations are hindered by the
present limits of the immunity statute, a legislative hearing
would appear to be an appropriate forum in which to gather the
opinions of the referees and judges who give section 7(a) (10)
its practical application.
One avenue for congressional remedy of the statute's current infirmity would entail an addition to section 7 (a) (10) to the
effect that no testimony will be used "either directly or indirectly" against the bankrupt in a subsequent trial.13 Yet, this
alteration is probably not a very likely subject of congressional
consideration in the near future. While Congress has amended
the Bankruptcy Act on several occasions subsequent to the judicial establishment of the debtor's right to invoke his privilege
against indirect use,14 there has been no attempt to expand the
existing scope of section 7 (a) (10) immunity.
12. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
13. Several state immunity statutes provide against subsequent
"direct or indirect" use, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 29, § 113 (1958); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANw. § 15:7 (1955), and are thought to intend that testimonial
fruits are thereby immunized. See Comment, State Immunity Statutes
in ConstitutionalPerspective, 1968 DuKE L.J. 311, 324.
14. Many of the weaknesses of the immunity proviso of the Bankruptcy Act were exposed shortly after it was first adopted in 1898. See,
e.g., Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913) (immunity does not
extend to § 7 schedules); In re Hooks Smelting Co., 138 F. 954 (E.D. Pa.
1905) (immunity grant inapplicable in § 21a examinations); In re Nachman, 114 F. 995 (D.S.C. 1902) (immunity grant does not insulate against
subsequent use of fruits of bankrupt's testimony). Yet, in 1938 when
Congress was considering the changes proposed in the Chandler
Amendment, it failed to expand the coverage of the immunity provision
and merely re-enacted the original language. See notes 4 and 5 supra
and accompanying text. Some courts have viewed this re-enactment
as implicit approval of the judicial interpretations given the original
statute. See, e.g., Meer v. United States, 235 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1956).
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III. USE OF BANKRUPT'S TESTIMONY IN STATE
PROCEEDINGS
Until recently, the section 7(a) (10) immunity grant was
seriously deficient in that it failed to insulate a bankrupt's testimony from use in a state criminal proceeding. An early case
raised the question of whether, in light of the immunization
offered by the Act, a debtor could refuse to give testimony
which could promote his conviction in a pending state proceeding.'5 Accepting the Counselman pronouncement that legislative immunity must afford the same protection that could have
been claimed by an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege, 6
the court noted that the bankruptcy statute did not purport to
grant interjurisdictional immunity and that, therefore, the bankrupt could refuse to make any utterance which might be used
against him in a state prosecution.1 7 In view of the temptation
of a financially unstable person to avoid local taxes, criminally
misrepresent assets to creditors, or otherwise seek economic equilibrium through illegal means, the effect of this holding was
significant; for it allowed the bankrupt to withhold any information which, if revealed, could reasonably be expected to be
used to support, either directly or indirectly, a state prosecution.
Although other bankruptcy cases accepted this view,'8 federal pronouncements in other areas of the law indicated that a
claim of state incrimination would not support invocation of the
federal constitutional privilege as long as the fifth amendment
was inapplicable in local courts.' 9 The implicit rationale was
that as long as the fifth amendment was inapplicable to the
states, there was no need to extend the immunity grant to
state prosecution.
This conflict between bankruptcy and general criminal law
precedents, although not resolved, was rendered irrelevant by
two Supreme Court decisions in 1964. In Malloy v. Hogan,20 the
fifth amendment guarantee was extended to litigants in state
proceedings. Were this extension not considered in the context
of immunity grants, it might appear that the early bankruptcy
cases had been correct in allowing a claim of the privilege to
prevent local use of testimony. On the same day the Court
15.

In re Scott, 95 F. 815 (W.D. Pa. 1899).

16. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.

17. 95 F. 817.
18. See, e.g., In re Hess, 134 F. 109, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1905); In re
Nachman, 114 F. 995 (D.S.C. 1902).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
20. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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decided Malloy, however, it decreed in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission2 ' that a judicially imposed exclusionary rule would
prohibit extrajurisdictional use of immunized testimony. Thus,
in order to gain the full breadth of constitutional protection, the
bankrupt need no longer invoke the fifth amendment privilege
to avoid incrimination in a state proceeding. Murphy extends
the immunity grant to state proceedings, thus prohibiting a
state's use of testimony given in a bankruptcy action pursuant
to section 7(a) (10).
The precise impact of Murphy on bankruptcy proceedings
has not yet been litigated, but it appears that the Court's reliance
on an exclusionary rule will appreciably broaden the types of
testimony which can be compelled. If the Bankruptcy Act is
viewed as an attempt to provide federal pre-eminence in the distribution of insolvent estates, the Murphy result seems desirable
as having removed impediments to the achievement of equitable
dissolution. Although some state interest in enforcement of its
criminal statutes will be partially frustrated, the net interference
with local prosecution is probably no greater than that existing
under former precedents which allowed insulation through invocation of the constitutional privilege.
Because the Murphy decision does not expressly deal with
the indirect use of the bankrupt's testimony in a state prosecution, the rule that the immunity grant is inapplicable to such use
continues to have effect. Therefore, legislative amendment to
correct this infirmity must be effective in preventing introduction of indirectly disclosed evidence by both federal and local
authorities. Since Congress has authority to define the scope of
interest of federal administrative agencies, it can properly re22
strict the investigative techniques employed by those bodies.
Similarly, congressional prerogative to effectuate an analogous
restraint on state authorities would arguably flow from the preemptive power available under the Supremacy Clause.23 Thus,
21. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Although the facts before the Court raised
the question of whether a defendant could refuse to testify in a state
proceeding on the ground that his responses might be subsequently
used by federal officials, the Court's announced rule was stated so
broadly as to preclude state use of federal testimony. Id. at 79.
22. Congressional authority for the establishment of administrative
agencies is usually identified as flowing from the enumerated powers
of article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution. Thus, the power to
create an administrative body may reasonably imply authority to specify
the scope of its functioning, including the types of procedures it should
observe in fulfilling the purpose for which it was formed.
23. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.

1968]

BANKRUPTCY EXAMINATIONS

each jurisdiction could be made to yield to the legislative desire to reserve in the bankruptcy court a power of examination
sufficiently flexible to insure disclosure of all the debtor's significant prior transactions.
IV.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

The question of whether a per se prohibition exists as to
subsequent use of legitimately immunized testimony, or whether
the bankrupt waives the immunity by a failure to affirmatively
assert it, has also received considerable attention. Those who
would prefer the former result argue that the language of the
statute--"testimony . . . shall not be offered"-is not qualified
and that, therefore, section 7(a) (10) disclosures are absolutely
incompetent in a subsequent proceeding. 24 The judiciary has,
however, largely resisted these arguments and concluded that an
objection must be raised at a subsequent trial if the bankrupt desires to claim the benefits of the section. Some courts felt that a
more literal construction would remove the debtor's right to consent to the use of his prior utterances, a result for which no policy
or legislative support could be found. 25 Consequently, a reviewing court may assume, absent specific objection, that the defendant has acquiesced to the use of his immunized testimony. While
the waiver or implied-consent rationale finds precedential support in other areas relating to the fifth amendment privilege,2 6 it
appears to be based on the need for efficient judicial administration rather than upon a realistic appraisal of the defendant's
intent.
If the bankrupt were not required to assert his immunity,
he could substantially reduce the risk of his conviction when
immunized testimony was introduced in a criminal proceeding
against him. If he did not receive a favorable verdict on the
merits of his case, he could claim a mistrial as a result of the
prosecution's misuse of his prior testimony. And if the prior
testimony had been material to his conviction, the trial or reviewing court would seemingly be compelled to grant the request, thus allowing for the possibility that the prosecution
would find the case unworthy of the time and financial expenditures involved in relitigation. These speculations as to
the disruptive effect of a per se prohibition of immunized testi24. See Bain v. United States, 262 F. 664, 669 (6th Cir. 1920).
25.
1921).
26.

Id.

See also Schonfeld v. United States, 277 F. 934 (2d Cir.

See 8 J. WIGmoRE, Ev N

.cE
§ 2276 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
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mony may be mitigated by the fact that such a mandate would
probably have the effect of increasing the caution exercised by
prosecutors in subjecting bankrupts to criminal prosecutions.
On the balance, however, the requirement that an objection be
affirmatively raised seems consistent with accepted notions of the
responsibility of the criminal litigant to provide for his own defense.
V. WAIVER OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Accompanying the judicial expansion of the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege has been a reaffirmation that the right
may be waived through either conscious rejection or a failure
of timely assertion. A threshold question met in bankruptcy
proceedings was whether a debtor who initiates proceedings to
settle his estate-and thereby affirmatively requests the court to
take over administration of his assets-has acquiesced to a
probing into his past activities which might otherwise have
been constitutionally protected. Proponents of this conclusion
would apparently assert that the petitioner could be assumed
to comprehend that the court proceeding would entail extensive
examination. 2 7 These assertions have been rejected, however,
on the ground that a failure to make sufficient revelation would
produce a denial of discharge, a penalty which adequately encouraged cooperation without derogating fundamental liberties. 28 While recent judicial developments would question the
assumed freedom with which discharge can be withheld for a
bankrupt's refusal to make incriminating disclosure, 29 rejection
of this waiver theory can be supported on a less vulnerable rationale.
Withholding the privilege from voluntary petitioners, while
at the same time preserving it for those whose creditors initiate
the proceedings, would clearly render the former a less desirable means through which to rectify financial instability. The
debtor who might otherwise voluntarily file in bankruptcy would
be encouraged to attempt continued management of his estate
27. See United States v. Goldstein, 132 F. 789, 791 (W.D. Va. 1904).
28. Id. While Collier's treatise on bankruptcy affirms that voluntary petitioners are entitled to assert the fifth amendment privilege,
no direct support for this position is offered in the cited authority.
See 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, f[7.21 n.8 (Moore ed. 1967), citing In re
Scott, 95 F. 815 (W.D. Pa. 1899).
29. See discussion entitled 'Denial of discharge for invocation of
the fifth amendment privilege" infra.
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until an involuntary petition is submitted against him. Since
he has presumably evidenced his inability to effectuate stable
commercial transactions at the point at which a voluntary proceeding would have been initiated, perpetuation of his continued
control of his assets finds little justification. Preserving the
fifth amendment rights of all debtors thus promotes the equation of the two routes to bankruptcy. 30 This result was apparently intended by Congress, since section 7(a) (10) immunizes
the testimony given during interrogation without qualification
as to the type of petition filed. There would be no need to extend the statutory insulation to the debtor submitting a voluntary petition if he could be said to have no privilege against
self-incrimination. While it might be urged that the unnecessary
immunity was the result of governmental largess, such a conclusion has no historical support, for early immunity statutes in
other contexts reflect religious attempts to restrict statutory
protection within the scope required by then current Supreme
Court pronouncements. 31 Thus, the immunity proviso in the
Bankruptcy Act more reasonably can be said to reflect a legislative assumption that the fifth amendment privilege was available irrespective of the procedure which yielded the debtor's
appearance before the bankruptcy court.
VI. IMMUNITY IN EXAMINATIONS UNDER SECTION 21(a)
Congress, in its desire to provide the referee with sufficient
information to achieve an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
30. Although the requirements for resort to the two types of petitions vary substantially, see 1 W. CoLmm, BA rKRUPTCY, I 4.03, 4.14,
the petitioner is generally subjected to the same procedural and substantive rules once he is before the court.
31. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the immunity
grant of the Interstate Commerce Act, while upheld, was found to afford only limited immunity and, therefore, to justify invocation of the
constitutional privilege as to unprotected matters. Shortly after that
decision, the Act's immunity grant was revised. In Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Court scrutinized this new statute and only by a
very broad reading of it was able to conclude that the legislative
change had accomplished extrajurisdictional immunity. Thus, it appeared that although Congress attempted to conform to the Court's
conception of full-breadth immunity, it was unwilling to use language
which might be interpreted as providing immunity beyond constitutional requirements.
This legislative desire to meet only minimum constitutional standards is quite reasonable since excessively broad immunity would preclude otherwise legitimate prosecutions for criminal activity while returning to the government no information it could not otherwise have
secured by resort to its contempt power.
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assets, allowed for examinations under both section 7 and section
21.32 While the former is directed solely to the bankrupt, the
latter may encompass interrogation of others:
The court may, upon application of any officer, bankrupt, or
creditor, by order require any designated persons, including the
bankrupt and his or her spouse, to appear before the court ...
to be examined concerning the acts, conduct, or property of a
bankrupt .... 33
A question soon arose as to whether the immunity extended
to the debtor through section 7(a) (10) would also insulate him in
a section 21(a) examination. Until recently, decisions specified
that no immunity was to be available under the general examination provision. The courts reaching this result felt that the
role of the bankrupt under section 21 was somehow different
from that under section 7; for in the former, "the bankrupt [is]
called merely as a witness [and] it is not made his duty to
testify."3 4
The phrasing of the two sections does not support a distinction based upon compulsion, for both merely call for submission
to an examination. Although the section 7 review is mandatory
in all proceedings while the section 21 interrogation provision
must be invoked by application of an officer of the court, a
creditor, or the bankrupt himself, the contempt power is readily
available under section 21 to insure the most complete disclosure
permissible under the fifth amendment. 35 The decisions which
seek to draw this distinction may intend that only under section
7 can a bankrupt be made to testify to matters which would
otherwise be protected by the fifth amendment. But even this
analysis is unacceptable because it begs the essential question of
whether testimony given in other than section 7 examinations
might be immunized and thus not subject to a claim of constitutional privilege.
Similarly, to distinguish the debtor's role under the respective sections finds little support in current bankruptcy practice.
Not only do the enabling provisions allow for examination on
many identical matters, 36 but it also appears to be accepted pro32. See note 3 supra.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1964).
34. Goldstein v. United States, 11 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 1926).
Accord, Cajiafas v. United States, 38 F.2d 3 (6th Cir. 1930); United
States v. Epstein, 152 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1957). See also McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
35. See United States v. Epstein, 152 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1957);
11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a), 13, 16 (1964) (contempt power).
36. In the § 7 interrogation, the bankrupt may be examined "concerning the conducting of his business, the cause of his bankruptcy, his
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cedure for a bankruptcy court to issue an order to appear which
purports to be based on both sections.3 7 Moreover, despite the
minor differences in the scope of applicability of the two examinations, both appear, as far as the bankrupt's testimony is concerned, to be aimed at the same objective: providing the court
with procedures sufficient to insure full disclosure. 38
There has been a move in the Second Circuit, initiated by
the late Judge Learned Hand, to assimilate sections 7 and 21
examinations. In In re Bush Terminal Company, 39 the circuit
court was asked to decide whether a former corporate director
could be made to answer for a bankrupt corporation's activities
even though he had disassociated himself from the entity prior to
its insolvency. While the majority concluded that he could only
be made to testify in a section 21 examination, Hand considered
the issue "academic" since "there is no difference . . .between
the scope of the two [sections]."4° The nature of the two sections
in the context of the immunity grant was questioned in United
States v. Weissman, 41 where Hand asserted summarily that "the
testimony [of the bankrupt] taken under section 21 (a) of the
Bankruptcy Act. . . was within the immunity granted by section
7 (a) (10)."42 The most recent Second Circuit case in which the
issue was raised is United States v. Castelana.43 There the court
strongly intimated that it would immunize a bankrupt's section
21 testimony, if incriminating and introduced in a subsequent
criminal trial. However, it refused to insulate testimony read
into the criminal record from depositions taken in connection
with separate civil litigation, citing cases which have refused
to expand the scope of the section 7 immunization grant. 44 Only
one court other than the Second Circuit has adopted a similar
dealings with his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and
whereabouts of his property, and, in addition, all matters which may
affect the administration ... of his estate. . . ." Under § 21(a), inquiry
is made into "the acts, conduct, or property of a bankrupt. . . ." Thus,
the latter appears to vary mainly in its lack of specificity. See Lipkin,
Examinations under Section 21a of the Bankruptcy Act and Their Use
in Subsequent Proceedings,25 REF.J.38 (1951).
37. See, e.g., In re Bush Terminal Co., 102 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1939).
38. See Comment, Applicability of the Immunity of Section 7(a)
(10) of the Bankruptcy Act to Representatives of a Corporate Bankrupt,
1959 Duy.E L.J. 608, 614.
39. 102 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1939).
40. Id. at 472.
41. 219 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1955).
42. Hand offered no further elaboration of the rationale supporting
his expansive view of § 7 immunity.
43. 349 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965).
44. Id. at 274.
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view of section 7(a) (10),45 but the point is infrequently litigated.
Although the Second Circuit's construction conforms with
the current view of practitioners regarding the purposes of the
two types of examination, it is achieved only by disregarding
that the statutory immunity grant is clearly connected to the
section 7 interrogation without any textual reference which
might indicate that a broader application was intended. Such a
format implies that Congress did not intend the immunity grant
to extend to section 21(a) examinations, but was willing to accept
less pervasive disclosures under section 21. While this result
may not be palatable in that it presumes a division of function
which cannot be readily effectuated, a readjustment is probably
best achieved through additional congressional action. Unfortunately judicial remedies such as that of the Second Circuit not
only produce inconsistency within the federal courts but also, by
providing a partial solution, relieve some of the pressure which
might otherwise be felt by the proper legislative body.
VII.

IMMUNITY OF REPRESENTATIVES OF A
CORPORATE BANKRUPT

Prior to 1938, inconsistent judicial responses were given to
the question of whether a corporate officer, director, or shareholder could claim the immunity given the "bankrupt" under
section 7(a) (10).46 When immunity was denied, of course, the
representative could invoke his fifth amendment guarantees
and refuse to make incriminating utterances. Apparently in
response to the confusion surrounding allocation of the bankrupt corporation's section 7 obligations, Congress, in 1938, added

section 7 (b) : 47
Where the bankrupt is a corporation, its officers, the members of
its board of directors or trustees or of other similar controlling
bodies, its stockholders or members, or such of them as may be
designated by the court, shall perform the duties imposed upon
the bankrupt by this Act.
Since this enactment, courts consistently have held that any
person appropriately classified under section 7(b) could claim
the immunity privilege of section 7 (a) (10).48
45. See In re Alphin & Lake Cotton Co., 131 F. 824 (E.D. Ark.
1904).
46. Compare Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 582 (1925), with In re Hooks Smelting Co., 138 F. 954
(E.D. Pa. 1905).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1964).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, 219 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.
1955); In re Bush Terminal Co., 102 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1939).
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Whether a former officer or director of a bankrupt corporation comes within section 7 (b) and therefore can be made
to answer on behalf of the corporation in a bankruptcy proceeding generally depends upon the availability of other knowledgeable sources of information within the shareholder or officer
group existing at the time of bankruptcy. While some decisions
have adopted arbitrary time limits according to which corporate
49
capacity of former officers or directors is to be judged, most
seem to reflect a more qualitative evaluation of the likelihood
that the former officer, director, or shareholder will possess information which is both relevant to the inquiry and unavailable from current representatives. 50
The phrasing of section 7(b) might seem to indicate that,
absent a specific appointment of a corporate representative by
the bankruptcy court, all current officers, directors, and shareholders bear equally the responsibility of performing the debtor's duties in a bankruptcy proceeding. Since by testifying, all
would be complying with section 7(b), each representative might
attempt to claim section 7 (a) (10) immunity. In apparent recognition that such broad-based insulation was both unnecessary
to securing adequate disclosure and undesirable in its preclusion
of many criminal prosecutions, United States v. Castellana5 '
sought to limit immunity grants only to particular corporate rep49. In In re Bush Terminal Co., 102 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1939), the
court upheld a former officer's resistance to an order for a § 7 examination. In the court's view, "one who has no authority to speak for the
bankrupt at the time he is required to testify may not be compelled
to submit to examination under that section." Id. at 471 (emphasis
added). However, there appears to be a good faith limitation which
would prohibit an officer or director from resigning his position in
order to avoid having to appear before a referee. See In re Bleecker,
14 F.2d 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) (corporate treasurer held in contempt for
refusing to produce books after he had resigned his position upon receipt of a subpoena).
An Ohio district court would look not to the time of testimony, but
rather to the point at which the petition was filed in making its
determination that a former affiliate should fulfill a bankrupt corporation's obligations under the Act. See In re Bell Refrigeration Corp.,
169 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
50. That bankruptcy courts are more interested in examining
knowledgeable parties than in strictly observing legal relationships is
illustrated by United States v. Weissman, 219 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1955).
In that case, the real owner of the corporate bankrupt was neither an
officer, director, nor shareholder of record. Yet, Learned Hand announced that the defendant could be made, pursuant to § 7(b), to act
on behalf of the corporation, since "he was the only person financially
interested in [the bankrupt] and he had absolute control of [its] conduct." Id.
51. 349 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965).
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resentatives. Construing the phrase "as may be designated by
the court"' 52 as an implicit expression of congressional intent
not to immunize every witness connected with a bankrupt corporation, the court decreed that immunity could be claimed only
by a representative "directed to appear by the bankruptcy
court." 53

Thus, it would appear that section 7 can no longer be viewed
as bestowing blanket immunity upon all corporate representatives. The facts of Castellana reveal that such a limitation is
necessary to assure appropriate government officials the authority to mete out punishment to those who would use a corporate
form with a view to intentional bankruptcy. To grant immunity
to all participants in such a scheme, of course, seems only to
further the instigators' attempts to abuse bankruptcy proceedings.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES RELATING TO THE
FILING OF SCHEDULES PURSUANT TO SECTION 7 (a) (8)

A.

INAPPLicABILIY oF

]

ImuNry GRANT

Among the bankrupt's duties under the Bankruptcy Act is
the requirement that he file with the court, referee, and trustee,
forms which are intended to reveal the types and identity of
assets and creditors.5 4 As early as 1913, the Supreme Court was
called upon to determine whether immunity should be extended
to these filings. In Ensign v. Pennsylvania,5 it was concluded
that the section 7(a) (8) schedule was not "testimony" within
the meaning of the immunity grant. In support of this view, the
observation was made that the schedule "may presumably be
prepared at leisure and scrutinized . . .with care" before verified, while oral testimony is given in "a proceeding more or less
unfriendly and inquisitiorial" and thus likely to produce confusion and inaccuracies. 56 Inapplicability of the immunity grant
meant that the full breadth of the fifth amendment privilege
was available to the filer, 57 and since the section 7(a) (f) schedule system is the basic source of information for the bankruptcy
52. 11 U.S.C. § 25(b) (1964).
53. 349 F.2d at 273. The holding of the court indicates insulation
will also be extended to an officer or director who, even without court
direction, performs such specific duties as filing the schedules required
under § 7. Id. at 274.
54. See Bankruptcy Act, § 7(a) (8), 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (8) (1964).
55.

227 U.S. 592 (1913).

56. Id. at 599-600.
57. See In re Naletsky, 280 F. 437 (D.Conn. 1921).
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court, the judiciary has subsequently been faced with consistent
attempts to avoid the result of Ensign and thus has had occasion
to carefully define the fifth amendment limitation.5 8

B. WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIINATION
Shortly after Ensign, the Supreme Court met with another
Governmental attempt to increase the utility of the filing system
by circumventing the privilege against self-incrimination. In
McCarthy v. Arndstein,5 9 the appellant bankrupt resisted the
lower court's finding that the filing of a section 7(a) (8) schedule
constituted a waiver of the fifth amendment as to all incriminating matters revealed therein and as to evidence unearthed
by investigators acting upon information disclosed. While subsequent citations of McCarthy have interpreted the case to hold
that filing does not constitute a waiver, 60 the actual holding is not
so simplistically stated. The Court, while finding no waiver on
the facts before it, did not purport to present a per se rule.
Rather, the Court intended to admonish other tribunals to dissect
the contents of the filing to ascertain whether the bankrupt had
disclosed facts sufficiently damning that, under existing precedents, he would not be allowed to refuse to reveal the totality of
the incriminating matter.6 ' As to threshold incriminations the
fifth amendment rights of the bankrupt were reaffirmed.

58. See Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931);
Optner v. United States, 13 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1926); In re Arend, 286 F.
516 (2d Cir. 1922); In re Naletsky, 280 F. 437 (D. Conn. 1921); In re
Podolin, 202 F. 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1913).
59. 262 U.S. 355 (1923).

60. See, e.g., Ashe, Immunity of Bankrupt Against Self-incrimination, 71 Com. L.J. 38, 41 (1966).
61. 262 U.S. at 359. Under the rules applicable at the time McCarthy was decided, a witness was deemed to have waived his privilege
as to a particular subject matter once he made an oral reference to

any aspect of the topic. Thus, having testified as to some items in his
inventory, the bankrupt could not refuse to disclose any other item held
in his storeroom. See In re Bendheim, 180 F. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
While one authority finds this doctrine viable today, see 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENcE § 2276, at 456 (Supp. 1964), it would seem subject to reevaluation in light of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In that case the
Supreme Court announced specifically that a criminal defendant who has
not consulted counsel retains a right to discontinue his responses at any
point in an interrogation. Since the Miranda dictate was tied to the
right-to-counsel question-an issue not yet fully developed in the bankruptcy context-the precedent would not fully repudiate the state of the
law assumed in McCarthy.
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C. DETERMINATION OF INCRIMINATORY NATURE
Recent decisions have further refined the bases upon which
constitutional objections may be raised. It is now accepted that
a broad and undefined claim of possible incrimination will not
justify a refusal to file the required schedules.6 2 Such a view
gains logical support from the fact that the totality of questions
posed in the schedules is so diverse as to render quite unlikely the
applicability of all to any single bankrupt. 63 Thus, a refusal
even to designate those inquiries which are irrelevant can reasonably be interpreted as revealing a less than good faith attempt to meet the Act's request for disclosure.
The formulation of a procedure which both observes constitutional requirements and allows the bankruptcy court to ascertain the validity of a privilege asserted in good faith has been a
perplexing problem. Courts recognized the need for such a
procedure early in the development of the schedule system and
espoused generalities which hopefully would guide a reviewing
court.64 Unfortunately, these decisions did not adequately define the role the bankrupt was to play in determining the incriminatory quality of particular utterances. On the one hand,
there was a recognition that the fifth amendment right was
highly personal and, in many of its applications, so absolute
that even requiring a justification for its assertion would violate
the intimacy intended to be preserved. 65 But at the same time,
not only were the potential abuses of leaving complete discretion in the bankrupt made evident, but the judiciary sensed that
the layman was ill-equipped to assess accurately the full legal
implications of his responses to schedule questions.66 Yet, not
until 1963 was a specific system of verfication outlined which
found general acceptance in other tribunals. A Maryland district court, in In re Mutual Security Savings & Loan Association,
Incorporated,67 announced that the bankrupt's initial response to
62.

See, e.g., In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.

(1967); In re Arend, 286 F. 516 (2d Cir. 1922).

63. For example, Schedule B-2 asks for a listing of the number of
horses, cows, and sheep owned by the bankrupt.
64. See, e.g., Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889 (10th Cir.
1931); In re Naletsky, 280 F. 437 (D. Conn. 1921). See also In re Podolin,
202 F. 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1913) which states, "[wihat is required is an effort
in good faith by the bankrupt to file a schedule that obeys the act [sic]
up to the point where the court can see that further obedience would
violate the constitutional protection."
65. See In re Naletsky, 280 F. 437, 443 (D. Conn. 1921).
66. See United States v. Lawson, 255 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1966).
67. 214 F. Supp. 877 (D. Md. 1963).
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the filing requirement was unsatisfactory, but instead of holding

the debtor in contempt, he was
• * * directed to provide to the Court, in a sealed envelope, a
statement by his counsel of the basis upon which [each] claim is
invoked. Such sealed envelope shall be for the use of the Court
only, and, after the envelope has been opened, the claim considered, and such further proceedings, if any, as may be indicated,
taken, the statement shall again be sealed and be subject to
examination only by any reviewing court to which [the bankrupt], being dissatisfied by the final disposition of this Court,
may apply.6S

The subsequent acceptance of this procedure serves to emphasize
the compromise wrought by it.69 The initial disclosure by the
bankrupt was insured confidentiality. Further, the burden of
establishing the worthiness of the claim was placed on the proponent and could be used to uncover unfounded and misguided
conceptions of possible incrimination. Finally, the format of the
new system was sufficiently definite that the steps necessary to
preserve the constitutional privilege could more accurately be
anticipated than under previously ill-defined procedures for
judicial review.
Despite the superficial attractiveness of the Mutual Security
approach, the Third Circuit in In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corporation70 found it constitutionally defective in at least three respects.
First, the system went too far in requiring the claimant to justify
his invocation of the fifth amendment. Rather than having to
present a detailed "basis" for his assertion, the debtor need only
reveal so much as to indicate to the judge that a full answer
might incriminate him.71 The potential result of the procedure
under review was to compel a bankrupt's disclosure against himself, and thus transgress the constitutional sanctity which the
amendment was intended to preserve. Second, the requirement
of a written statement in lieu of a personal appearance seemed
to violate the court's understanding of the delicate and gradually
more probing review a judge should undertake in assessing a
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. The judge has
an "affirmative duty ... to safeguard the constitutional privilege
68. Id. at 882.
69. Although the issue of protecting the bankrupt from incriminatory schedule disclosures is infrequently litigated, the two courts which
reviewed the Mutual Security procedure in the period between its introduction and demise (see note 70 infra, and accompanying text) gave unequivocal endorsement to it. See United States v. Lawson, 255 F. Supp.
261 (D.Minn. 1966); In re John Lakis, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
70. 373 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1967).
71. Id. at 627-28.
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when it is invoked and to be guided in making his determination
by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case in light
of the surrounding circumstances. ' 72 Apparently, inquiry should
be made only to the extent that it reveals a reasonable possibility
of incrimination. Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the secrecy
of the Mutual Security system. Finding historical support for
its condemnation of in camera review,7 3 the court reasoned that
a practice of secret disclosure
...is bound ultimately to beget a requirement of the maximum
disclosure to prove the right to the privilege, in contrast to a
proceeding in open court where the disclosure may be interpreted [sic] at the point74where the right to the privilege becomes clear to the judge.
The spirit of the Hoffman court's scrutiny of the Mutual
Security procedure is consistent with recent Supreme Court
pronouncements concerning the sanctity of the fifth amendment
privilege.7 5 Somewhat troublesome, however, is the intimation
that the right is so absolute that it precludes effective investigation of the validity of an invocation of the privilege. The revisions which Hoffman would require, in effect, leave the courts
without a determination of the extent to which they can probe
beyond an assertion of the fifth amendment right; for the court's
conception of a step-by-step inquiry presumes a qualitative delineation between incriminatory and non-incriminatory utterances which does not appear to have a basis in fact. Thus, it is
doubtful that a reviewing judge can accurately ascertain the
existence of self-incrimination without a more general idea of
the scope of the bankrupt's activities than Hoffman would permit.
For example, the admission of ownership of a truck on a schedule
of assets appears innocuous and, standing alone, would not seem
privileged under fifth amendment standards. Even the fact that
the truck was used to transport household appliances would
indicate no incrimination. When placed in context of a bankrupt's association with known thieves and hi-jackers, however,
72. Id. at 628.
73.

8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (Supp. 1964).

74.

373 F.2d at 628-29.

75. The Third Circuit reiterates with approval a statement by
Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14,692e)
(C.C. Va. 1807):
It belongs to the court to consider and to decide whether any
direct answer ... can implicate the witness. If this be decided
in the negative, then he may answer . . . without violating the
privilege ....
If a direct answer . . . may criminate himself,
then he must be the sole judge what this answer would be. The
court cannot participate with him in this judgment, because they
cannot decide on the effect of his answer without knowing what
it would be.
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the description of even the truck may yield incriminating information which can be connected to collateral crimes. Yet, the
Hoffman dictate would seem to require that a judge, without
further inquiry into the actual use of the vehicles, decide at
this point whether the fifth amendment would relieve the bankrupt from his duty to list the truck in his section 7 (a) (8)
schedule. In light of the presumed need of the bankruptcy
court for all relevant information covering an estate, it would
be preferable to allow the court to evaluate the actual connection
between the debtor's ownership of the vehicle and his association
with thieves, thus avoiding an excessively broad grant of constitutional insulation. While it can be hypothesized that conditioning the privilege upon a requirement that the bankrupt
incriminate himself in order to establish the validity of his
claim might be abused if used to furnish information to persons
investigating collateral crimes, this potential abuse can be eliminated by an exclusionary rule prohibiting introduction of the incriminatory statements in a subsequent proceeding. 6
IX. BOOKS AND RECORDS UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
While the scope of the fifth amendment's protection in bankruptcy proceedings has generally corresponded with the expanding Supreme Court views of the privilege, one area-that
concerned with a bankrupt's books and records as a source of
incrimination-has been left largely unaffected. It was early
decreed that a bankrupt had no right to protest the use in a
subsequent criminal proceeding of information found in his business records, for under section 70(a) title to the records passed
to the trustee upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. 77
While debtors protested that the practical effect was the same
irrespective of whether the incriminating information was given
in written or oral form, the Supreme Court announced in 1911
that, in its view,
...no constitutional rights are touched. The question is not of
testimony but of surrender-not of compelling the bankrupt
to be a witness against himself in a criminal case ... but of
compelling him to yield possession of property that he no longer
is entitled to keep.78
This rule applies equally to individual and corporate bank76. See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
77. See Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147 (1923); Johnson v. United
States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913); In 'e Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911).
78. In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911).
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rupts, 79 and the bankruptcy court officials are without statutory
authority to enter into agreements with bankrupts to limit the
use which may be made of confiscated documents. 0
Even those courts which have reevaluated former precedents
in light of expanding constitutional privileges have accepted,
without alteration, previous Supreme Court rules as to the unprotected nature of the debtor's books and records. 81 However,
this contemporary reception, to the extent it affects corporate
bankrupts, conforms with decisions relating to the business papers of non-bankrupts. The Supreme Court has consistently
ruled that a corporate officer can claim no immunity for the
business records of his corporation. 2 Denominated the "public
records exception" to the fifth amendment, it is premised upon
the view that the privilege is "personal" and protects only admissions by natural persons. Recordation of corporate transactions, even though performed by natural persons, is undertaken
on behalf of the corporation. 83 Thus, even if the title-passing
rationale of the bankruptcy cases were abandoned, representatives of bankrupt corporations could probably not expect to
gain any greater access to the constitutional protection.
Equal treatment does not exist between bankrupt and solvent
individuals, for the law allows the individual businessman to
claim the privilege as to all of his business papers except those
which are kept pursuant to a specific economic regulation.8 4 Although such seemingly inconsistent results might be said to constitute classification without a rational basis, and therefore be
79. Compare In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923), with United States v.
Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
80. In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923). Prior to 1964, when the fifth
amendment had not yet been made applicable to the states, the Supreme

Court chose to reject a debtor's attempt to resist subpoena of his records
by a state authority for use in a local proceeding on the grounds that
his "right ...
to protest against the use of his books ...
ceases as soon
as his possession and control over them pass from him ....
" Dier v.

Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1923).

Therefore, the rule of Murphy v.

Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52 (1964), which extended the immunity

grant to state criminal prosecution, does not alter the rule that there is

no privilege against self-incrimination regarding books and records in

the possession of the trustee.
81.

See In re Mutual Security Savings & Loan Ass'n, Inc., 214 F.

Supp. 877, 883 (D. Md. 1963).
82. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
83. See Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE

L.J. 1111 (1947); Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarranAct, and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,18 U. Cm. L. REV. 687 (1951).
84. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Note, 68 HAI'v. L. REv. 340 (1954).
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subject to constitutional infirmities, such a contention fails on
two grounds. First, the clear intent of the Act, as evidenced by
the provision allowing the trustee to take control of the debtor's records, 85 is to enter the documents into the public sector
for scrutiny both by creditors and the court. Since, as one
court has noted, the bankrupt can be presumed to comprehend
the consequence of his failure to function successfully in a voluntarily-assumed commercial relationship with society, 6 he
should not be heard to object that the making public of his
records was against his will. Secondly, it might be contended
that, in fact, there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing availability of the fifth amendment privilege to bankrupt and nonbankrupt individuals. Since the debtor has evidenced his inability to fulfill commercial obligations, there is a need for someone to step in and insure that the bankrupt's responsibilities to
creditors are fulfilled as equitably as possible. The framers of
the Constitution, in apparent recognition of this need, granted
to Congress the power "to establish . . . uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies .
*...
"87
And, in order to assist a just
distribution, the records which detail past dealings with creditors are reasonably withdrawn from the bankrupt's control.
Both of these arguments can be challenged by noting that
the court's need for full disclosure of the materials encompassed
in the debtor's books and records could be satisifed by a grant
of immunity covering any incriminations found therein. Also, it
might be argued that allowing congressional regulatory power to
override fundamental privileges could, in its logical extension,
totally emasculate those privileges. Thus, the need for complete
disclosure to insure equitable distribution might effectively
eliminate the fifth amendment's applicability to sections 7
and 21 (a) examinations. However, given the established protections in most other areas of bankruptcy law, the "potential
abuse" rationale is somewhat inappropriate. Business books
and records play a critical role, both in assuring the trustee
a reasonably efficient temporary management if he takes possession of the business, and in providing the referee with data
85. Bankruptcy Act, § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
86. United States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1931): "Thus,
by coming through his own acts under the substantive law of insolvency, he has involved himself in a waiver of his right to claim that his
papers should remain wholly inviolate ....
87. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generalIy THE FEDERa ST No.
42; Kreft, What is the "Subject of Bankruptcies"?, 6 TFms. L.Q. 141
(1932).
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which will help locate assets and creditors. Unless an equally
productive means of disclosure is adopted, the books and records exceptions to the fifth amendment, in the bankruptcy context, seems justifiable.
X. THE DENIAL OF DISCHARGE FOR INVOCATION OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
Bankruptcy proceedings are designed to achieve two ends.
First, creditors are to receive shares of the debtor's estate in
accordance with the substantive rules of distribution. Second,
even though creditors receive less than full satisfaction of their
claims, the debtor may be discharged from further obligation
to most of those with whom he has had previous commercial
dealings. While a petition in bankruptcy ideally produces both
results, the goals are separable since they are realized only upon
satisfaction of distinct conditions.
A discharge may be denied if -the bankrupt "refused ... to
answer any material question approved by the court; or...
has
failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets ... ."88 Construction of the language has led to the rule that invocation of
the fifth amendment privilege may provide a basis for denial of
discharge, and those courts that have done so have been uniform
in their analysis of the justification for such a result. Typical is
the view taken by the Second Circuit in In re Dresser:
We entertain no doubt that it is within the power of Congress
to grant or to refuse a discharge to a bankrupt upon such conditions as it may deem proper. Such a privilege is not a natural
right, . . . but is a matter of favor, to be accepted upon such
terms as Congress sees fit to impose.8 9
A more recent decision paraphrased the famous epigram of
Oliver Wendell Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford:00
"[the bankrupt] had a constitutional right to refuse to answer
the questions propounded . . . , but he had no constitutional
91
right to a discharge in bankruptcy.
88. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 14(c)(6),(7), 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(c)(6),(7)
(1964). See generally Shailman, Bankruptcy-Section 14(c) (7), Another
Milestone on the Historical Road Toward Protecting the Creditor
Against Dishonest Petitions,34 REF. J. 54 (1960).

89. 146 F. 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1906); accord, Kaufman v. Hurwitz,

176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949); In re Bauknight, 14 F.2d 674 (S.D. Fla.
1926); In re Weinreb, 153 F. 363 (2d Cir. 1907); In re Leslie, 119 F. 406
(N.D.N.Y. 1903).
90. 155 Mass.216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

91. In re Zaidins, 287 F.2d 401, 402 (7th Cir. 1961), affg 182 F.
Supp. 543 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
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Denial of discharge for invocation of the fifth amendment
may now be open to scrutiny in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions regarding the establishment of onerous conditions
upon resort to the privilege against self-incrimination. The
most cogent basis for reevaluation was offered by the Court in
Garrity v. New Jersey,92 where several policemen sought reversal of convictions gained through use of incriminating testimony given under threat of loss of their positions. The Court
reversed the convictions on the ground that "the option to lose
[a] means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination
is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent."93
The majority also rejected the Holmes "right-privilege" distinction as inappropriate in consideration of the constitutional ques94
tion before the court.
Initially the denial of a discharge in bankruptcy for invocation of the fifth amendment privilege seems vulnerable to the
Garrity rationale, since the debtor, in a sense, is presented the
same coercive option-he must either testify against himself or
lose the opportunity to begin his financial life anew. Without
the discharge, he may be subjected to continued garnishments
and collection suits; but in order to gain a reprieve, he may
be exposed to criminal prosecution. The Garrity decision prohibits the government from placing its citizens "between the rock
and the whirlpool." 95 Yet, since Garrity is the culmination of a
series of decisions dealing with the rights of public employees, its
applicability to bankruptcy is not certain.
Commentators have identified the Garrity decision as a further exemplification of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions: The government is forbidden "to condition its largess
upon the willingness of the petitioner to surrender a right
which he would otherwise be entitled to exercise as a private
citizen." 0 Thus, contrary to Dresser, this view would not allow
Congress to condition its "favors" upon any terms it desired.
In order to avail himself of the benefits of this doctrine, however,
the claimant "must demonstrate that the condition of which he
complains is unreasonable in the special sense that it prohibits
92.
(1967).
93.
94.
95.
(1966).

385 U.S. 493 (1967).

See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511

385 U.S. at 497.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 496, quoting from Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243

96. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1446 (1968).
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or abridges the exercise of a right protected by an explicit provision in the Constitution.19 7 This prerequisite would seemingly present little difficulty in bankruptcy, however, since the
bankrupt would simply point to the potential infringement upon
his fifth amendment rights. While direct application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions would upset the bankruptcy
decisions which allow a denial of discharge when the bankrupt
relies upon the fifth amendment, the doctrine itself has been
criticized for its failure to inquire further into governmental
needs for the information acquired through abridgement of a
constitutional privilege. 98
This call for an evaluation of governmental objectives is particularly pertinent in bankruptcy. Evident in decisions supporting a denial of discharge for failure to disclose material information is the view that the structure of the enactment reflects a
congressional desire to extend the benefits of bankruptcy only to
debtors who are "honest"-that is, willing to cooperate with the
court in achieving a just settlement of the claims of creditors. 99
Thus, the debtor who may be concealing a significant part of
his estate is not viewed as deserving of absolution from his
financial obligations. Information about each of the debtor's
prior significant transactions is needed to insure to creditors a
satisfaction of their claims which is equitable in light of the bankrupt's limited resources.
Yet, it can be argued that a similarly strong policy supported the condition placed upon Officer Garrity's employment.
The State of New Jersey argued that the preservation of the
integrity of its local law enforcement-and thus preservation of
local internal security-demanded that officers who misuse
their positions be dismissed. 100 This policy, too, is based on a
need for information-information without which unworthy
policemen might be harbored. Thus if the need for disclosure in
bankruptcy proceedings is no more compelling than that asserted
by New Jersey, the Garrity result would indicate that denials
of discharge may be held to infringe upon the fifth amendment
protection.
The Garrity case may not be entirely probative of the bankruptcy issue, however, for the Court attempted only to remedy a
97. Id. at 1447.
98. Id. at 1448-49.
99. See, e.g., In re Bauknight, 14 F.2d 674 (S.D. Fla. 1926); In re
Leslie, 119 F. 406, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1903).
100. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 506-09 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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conviction based on coerced incrimination and was not faced
with the issue of delineating the proper scope of governmental
interest. The Court was not asserting that New Jersey could
not dismiss unworthy officers but rather only that the procedure leading to dismissal could not provide criminal conviction as the only alternative for an officer under interrogation.
However, the decision does renew the issue regarding the extent
to which a bankruptcy court can deny a discharge for inadequate disclosure.
In analyzing this question, two extremes can be easily dismissed. A discharge should not be withheld merely because the
debtor invoked the privilege at some point in his examination,
for information sufficient to insure equitable settlement of creditor's claim might otherwise be present. On the other hand, a
discharge should not be granted if the debtor refuses to answer
all inquiries, since many questions may be so innocuous that a
refusal to answer evidences a lack of good faith. 10 1 Between
these extremes, of course, lies the heart of the problem posed
by Garrity.
Further refinement of a constitutionally acceptable basis for
a denial of discharge would seem to require not only a further
delineation of the breadth of disclosure necessary to achieve the
objectives of the Act, but also an evaluation of feasible alternatives to direct disclosure by the bankrupt. 10 2 The extent of
disclosure needed to insure equitable settlement of creditors'
claims cannot be presented with mathematical certainty, so any
standard should be functionally based. Thus, the court should
be allowed to withhold discharge until it is reasonably satisfied
both that no assets which would produce a significantly greater
return for creditors are being concealed, and that no undisclosed preferential transfers have been effectuated in violation
of the Act. Such a functional rule leaves to the officer of the
court discretion to evaluate the satisfactory nature of available
information.
Yet, a mere finding of insufficient information would not
seem to justify placing the bankrupt in the "incrimination-denial
of discharge" dilemma. Rather, the court should be required to
exhaust other available sources of information. The section
21(a) examination, which may be utilized for the interrogation
of persons other than the bankrupt, would seemingly provide an
appropriate alternative. Through this means, creditors, associ101. See note 63 supra.

102. Cf. In re Harnik, 151 P. Supp. 504, 512-13 (W.D. Ark. 1957).
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ates, and the spouse of the bankrupt could be made to testify.10 3
To insure that this source is fully utilized, the bankrupt should,
on appeal, be entitled to reversal of a denial of discharge when
the court fails to examine a party who reasonably might be
thought to possess relevant information. When the court exhausts alternative informational channels and still believes that
sufficient disclosure to achieve equitable resolution of creditor
claims has not been made, then a denial of discharge would
seemingly be proper.
While the language of some past decisions would not comport with the conditions suggested above, 10 4 the actual holdings
of most cases seem to give adequate deference to the debtor's
claim of privilege. What has been lacking, however, is a much
needed reevaluation of the strictures of the statutory language
which permits denial of a discharge. While such a reevaluation
might be forthcoming from the judiciary, it could appropriately
be included in a general legislative reconsideration of the adequacy of disclosure techniques. The particular difficulties raised
by Garrity are notably related to the limitations of the present immunity grant in section 7(a) (10). If that proviso were
amended to preclude indirect use of the debtor's oral testimony
and to encompass disclosures made in section 7 (a) (8) schedules,
the bankrupt's resort to the fifth amendment privilege would
be forestalled. Not only would such an expansion of immunity allow the court to secure the range of disclosure needed to
insure equitable claim settlement, but also more broadly-based
immunity would seemingly avoid the questions raised by Garrity, and render unnecessary resort to the unsettled right-privilege distinction.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Operating under an immunity provision which traces its
legislative origins to 1898, bankruptcy courts are called upon to
respect the delicate balance between their need for disclosure and
the debtor's fundamental constitutional privilege. Yet, because
recent expansions of the scope of fifth amendment applicability
103. The suggestion that parties other than the bankrupt be relied
upon to furnish pertinent information has been specifically rejected in
In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1967):
The Bankruptcy Court was entitled to have from the appellants
themselves

. . .

the requisite information, which may well have

differed from that which would have been available from creditors or accountants.
104. See, e.g., In re Zaidins, 287 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1961); Kaufman
v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949).
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have rendered the original legislative intent largely irrelevant,
judicial decisions regarding section 7 (a) (10) are now made without determination of the extent to which governmental authority
should tolerate limitations on its right of prosecution. The
needed guideline could be supplied, however, by extensive congressional reevaluation of the adequacy of the current immunity
grant. The present scope of immunity may be found adequate.
If, for example, it was revealed that techniques of investigation
and discovery have so improved since 1898 that the importance
of the role played by the debtor in bankruptcy disclosure is
minimal, little justification would exist for allowing the bankrupt
broadbased insulation from future prosecution. Or if the
bankruptcy courts were given pervasive independent investigative powers-perhaps including authorization for field investigators or immunity grants to those other than the bankrupt-the referee might not need to rely upon the bankrupt as
the primary source of information sufficient to insure an equitable estate settlement. If, however, it was determined that the
bankrupt must continue to play the key role in these disclosures,
several modifications of the present system are needed. Immunity should probably be extended to section 7 schedules since
there exists much confusion both as to the protection available
to the bankrupt and the type of procedure which may constitutionally be employed to verify the validity of a claim to the
privilege. Further, it might be found desirable to specify that
the "fruits" of incriminations revealed in section 7 examinations
may not subsequently be used against the bankrupt. Finally,
it would seem appropriate in light of present practice to specify
that immunity extends to all of the bankrupt's testimony
without regard to whether it is elicited under section 7 or section 21(a).
Since reappraisal might reveal that some of the premises of
current interpretations are unfounded, the crucial matter, of
course, is not whether these suggestions are accepted. Rather, it
would seem most important that the fifth amendment privilege of future bankrupts not be jeopardized by a continuation of
piecemeal attempts to align bankruptcy practice with recent
expansion in the scope of the amendment's guarantee.

